The Indian Express | An astonishing mandate
This article was published in The Indian Express dated May15, 2013. The original URL is given below.
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A traditional base and disillusioned PPP voters can't explain the PML-N's win
The morning after the night before, an air of disbelief hung over much of Pakistan. This, many thought, was supposed to be Imran Khan's moment. His barnstorming campaign in the weeks running up to the election appeared to have shaken up the electorate.
Instead, it was Nawaz Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League-N who marched to a victory few thought possible. The PML-N has captured a near-majority in the National Assembly, an astonishing success given that no one, not even the PML-N leadership itself, believed anything other than a coalition government was the most likely scenario after May 11.
How did the PML-N do it? First, it appears to have protected its electoral base with a relatively — in Pakistan, the emphasis on relatively can never be overstated — solid and corruption-free stint in Punjab, where the PML-N has controlled the provincial government the past five years. That formidable PML-N base, in a province with 150, including Islamabad, of the country's 272 directly elected MNAs, sets up a challenge by the party every time.
Political machinations and manipulations, particularly by the army-led security establishment, have skewed many an election result in Pakistan over the years, but adjusting for those effects, some fairly reliable conclusions can be drawn. First, since 1993, in an election Benazir Bhutto won to become prime minister for the second time, through to 1997, when Sharif won a second term in a landslide victory with significant establishment support, to 2002, when the N-League was deliberately decimated by Musharraf, to 2008, when Sharif's party surged to a surprise second-place finish overall after he was allowed to return from exile at the last minute, and to last Saturday's triumph, the PML-N and Punjab's love affair has not just proved durable, it is deepening.
Sharif is the Punjabi middle-class poster child: rich beyond imagination, never strayed far from his provincial roots and a good Muslim to boot. Barring some disastrous electoral misjudgement or a catastrophic stint in office, Sharif's PML-N will always get a large chunk of the votes in Punjab.
Second, the electoral misjudgement and catastrophic stint in office of the PPP. Punjab, where the PPP has a declining though still significant vote bank, has been blighted by PPP misrule over the past five years, much like the rest of the country.
An epic energy crisis has left homes and small businesses, the engine of the economy and job creation, without electricity and gas. Inflation soared and remained at unacceptable levels throughout the PPP's term. And the singular obsession of the PPP leadership in Islamabad with completing its term came at the cost of policy formulation and implementation.
Given a choice between sticking with the PPP for ideological reasons — the PPP's vote bank in Punjab is largely poor and beholden to the political awakening Zulfikar Ali Bhutto engineered in the late 1960s and early '70s — and choosing something else, the PPP voter appears to have abandoned his party for Sharif. The switch seems to have been exacerbated by the PPP's inexplicable non-campaign, even in swathes of Punjab where the threat of violence was lower than in the rest of Pakistan.
Third, Imran Khan's message proved to be narrow and shallow, instead of broad and deep as he had hoped and hyped. He promised to change Pakistan and rivet the nation. Khan did do that, but for far too few people.
Perhaps the single most damning indictment of Khan's quest to reach for the electoral stars without the rocket fuel of a strong message is that in one important metric, he and his party got exactly what they had hoped for — a high turnout — and yet failed to get much mileage out of it. A high turnout out was supposed to swing the election decisively towards Khan because Pakistanis were allegedly uninspired by the established political powers and new voters — either young people included in the electoral rolls for the first time or older habitual non-voters — could only be tempted into voting by Khan's rhetoric of change. That logic made so much sense that it will take psephologists and the parties themselves a while to understand why an apparently record turnout swung towards the PML-N instead of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf.
The staggering numbers that many PML-N winners racked up on Saturday are too high to be explained simply by a traditional PML-N vote bank buttressed by disillusioned PPP voters. Part of the answer may lie in what appears to be a large number of otherwise silent members of the public who selectively participate in politics when their imagination is fired.
During the movement to restore Chief Justice Chaudhry in 2007-08, this group stood up to be counted. Now, inundated by a tidal wave of media coverage of the election and unimpressed by Khan's message of change, they turned out on May 11 to express their preference of leader. This was for Sharif. Everyone outside the PML-N will have to go back to the drawing board to figure out why, and how to change that the next time round.
The writer is an Islamabad-based assistant editor with 'Dawn'
express@expressindia.com
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A traditional base and disillusioned PPP voters can't explain the PML-N's win
The morning after the night before, an air of disbelief hung over
much of Pakistan. This, many thought, was supposed to be Imran Khan's
moment. His barnstorming campaign in the weeks running up to the
election appeared to have shaken up the electorate.
Instead, it was Nawaz Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League-N who marched to a victory few thought possible. The PML-N has captured a near-majority in the National Assembly, an astonishing success given that no one, not even the PML-N leadership itself, believed anything other than a coalition government was the most likely scenario after May 11.
How did the PML-N do it? First, it appears to have protected its electoral base with a relatively — in Pakistan, the emphasis on relatively can never be overstated — solid and corruption-free stint in Punjab, where the PML-N has controlled the provincial government the past five years. That formidable PML-N base, in a province with 150, including Islamabad, of the country's 272 directly elected MNAs, sets up a challenge by the party every time.
Political machinations and manipulations, particularly by the army-led security establishment, have skewed many an election result in Pakistan over the years, but adjusting for those effects, some fairly reliable conclusions can be drawn. First, since 1993, in an election Benazir Bhutto won to become prime minister for the second time, through to 1997, when Sharif won a second term in a landslide victory with significant establishment support, to 2002, when the N-League was deliberately decimated by Musharraf, to 2008, when Sharif's party surged to a surprise second-place finish overall after he was allowed to return from exile at the last minute, and to last Saturday's triumph, the PML-N and Punjab's love affair has not just proved durable, it is deepening.
Sharif is the Punjabi middle-class poster child: rich beyond imagination, never strayed far from his provincial roots and a good Muslim to boot. Barring some disastrous electoral misjudgement or a catastrophic stint in office, Sharif's PML-N will always get a large chunk of the votes in Punjab.
Second, the electoral misjudgement and catastrophic stint in office of the PPP. Punjab, where the PPP has a declining though still significant vote bank, has been blighted by PPP misrule over the past five years, much like the rest of the country.
An epic energy crisis has left homes and small businesses, the engine of the economy and job creation, without electricity and gas. Inflation soared and remained at unacceptable levels throughout the PPP's term. And the singular obsession of the PPP leadership in Islamabad with completing its term came at the cost of policy formulation and implementation.
Given a choice between sticking with the PPP for ideological reasons — the PPP's vote bank in Punjab is largely poor and beholden to the political awakening Zulfikar Ali Bhutto engineered in the late 1960s and early '70s — and choosing something else, the PPP voter appears to have abandoned his party for Sharif. The switch seems to have been exacerbated by the PPP's inexplicable non-campaign, even in swathes of Punjab where the threat of violence was lower than in the rest of Pakistan.
Third, Imran Khan's message proved to be narrow and shallow, instead of broad and deep as he had hoped and hyped. He promised to change Pakistan and rivet the nation. Khan did do that, but for far too few people.
Perhaps the single most damning indictment of Khan's quest to reach for the electoral stars without the rocket fuel of a strong message is that in one important metric, he and his party got exactly what they had hoped for — a high turnout — and yet failed to get much mileage out of it. A high turnout out was supposed to swing the election decisively towards Khan because Pakistanis were allegedly uninspired by the established political powers and new voters — either young people included in the electoral rolls for the first time or older habitual non-voters — could only be tempted into voting by Khan's rhetoric of change. That logic made so much sense that it will take psephologists and the parties themselves a while to understand why an apparently record turnout swung towards the PML-N instead of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf.
The staggering numbers that many PML-N winners racked up on Saturday are too high to be explained simply by a traditional PML-N vote bank buttressed by disillusioned PPP voters. Part of the answer may lie in what appears to be a large number of otherwise silent members of the public who selectively participate in politics when their imagination is fired.
During the movement to restore Chief Justice Chaudhry in 2007-08, this group stood up to be counted. Now, inundated by a tidal wave of media coverage of the election and unimpressed by Khan's message of change, they turned out on May 11 to express their preference of leader. This was for Sharif. Everyone outside the PML-N will have to go back to the drawing board to figure out why, and how to change that the next time round.
The writer is an Islamabad-based assistant editor with 'Dawn'
express@expressindia.com
- See more at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/an-astonishing-mandate/1115955/0#sthash.C8xy8yd0.dpuf
Instead, it was Nawaz Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League-N who marched to a victory few thought possible. The PML-N has captured a near-majority in the National Assembly, an astonishing success given that no one, not even the PML-N leadership itself, believed anything other than a coalition government was the most likely scenario after May 11.
How did the PML-N do it? First, it appears to have protected its electoral base with a relatively — in Pakistan, the emphasis on relatively can never be overstated — solid and corruption-free stint in Punjab, where the PML-N has controlled the provincial government the past five years. That formidable PML-N base, in a province with 150, including Islamabad, of the country's 272 directly elected MNAs, sets up a challenge by the party every time.
Political machinations and manipulations, particularly by the army-led security establishment, have skewed many an election result in Pakistan over the years, but adjusting for those effects, some fairly reliable conclusions can be drawn. First, since 1993, in an election Benazir Bhutto won to become prime minister for the second time, through to 1997, when Sharif won a second term in a landslide victory with significant establishment support, to 2002, when the N-League was deliberately decimated by Musharraf, to 2008, when Sharif's party surged to a surprise second-place finish overall after he was allowed to return from exile at the last minute, and to last Saturday's triumph, the PML-N and Punjab's love affair has not just proved durable, it is deepening.
Sharif is the Punjabi middle-class poster child: rich beyond imagination, never strayed far from his provincial roots and a good Muslim to boot. Barring some disastrous electoral misjudgement or a catastrophic stint in office, Sharif's PML-N will always get a large chunk of the votes in Punjab.
Second, the electoral misjudgement and catastrophic stint in office of the PPP. Punjab, where the PPP has a declining though still significant vote bank, has been blighted by PPP misrule over the past five years, much like the rest of the country.
An epic energy crisis has left homes and small businesses, the engine of the economy and job creation, without electricity and gas. Inflation soared and remained at unacceptable levels throughout the PPP's term. And the singular obsession of the PPP leadership in Islamabad with completing its term came at the cost of policy formulation and implementation.
Given a choice between sticking with the PPP for ideological reasons — the PPP's vote bank in Punjab is largely poor and beholden to the political awakening Zulfikar Ali Bhutto engineered in the late 1960s and early '70s — and choosing something else, the PPP voter appears to have abandoned his party for Sharif. The switch seems to have been exacerbated by the PPP's inexplicable non-campaign, even in swathes of Punjab where the threat of violence was lower than in the rest of Pakistan.
Third, Imran Khan's message proved to be narrow and shallow, instead of broad and deep as he had hoped and hyped. He promised to change Pakistan and rivet the nation. Khan did do that, but for far too few people.
Perhaps the single most damning indictment of Khan's quest to reach for the electoral stars without the rocket fuel of a strong message is that in one important metric, he and his party got exactly what they had hoped for — a high turnout — and yet failed to get much mileage out of it. A high turnout out was supposed to swing the election decisively towards Khan because Pakistanis were allegedly uninspired by the established political powers and new voters — either young people included in the electoral rolls for the first time or older habitual non-voters — could only be tempted into voting by Khan's rhetoric of change. That logic made so much sense that it will take psephologists and the parties themselves a while to understand why an apparently record turnout swung towards the PML-N instead of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf.
The staggering numbers that many PML-N winners racked up on Saturday are too high to be explained simply by a traditional PML-N vote bank buttressed by disillusioned PPP voters. Part of the answer may lie in what appears to be a large number of otherwise silent members of the public who selectively participate in politics when their imagination is fired.
During the movement to restore Chief Justice Chaudhry in 2007-08, this group stood up to be counted. Now, inundated by a tidal wave of media coverage of the election and unimpressed by Khan's message of change, they turned out on May 11 to express their preference of leader. This was for Sharif. Everyone outside the PML-N will have to go back to the drawing board to figure out why, and how to change that the next time round.
The writer is an Islamabad-based assistant editor with 'Dawn'
express@expressindia.com
- See more at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/an-astonishing-mandate/1115955/0#sthash.C8xy8yd0.dpuf
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